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Riassunto: La donazione nel diritto internazionale privato è un vecchio problema sia per la quali-
ficazione dell’ istituto che per l’ attuale scenario in alcuni Stati europei. L’ articolo si prefigge di anal-
izzare brevemente la relazione che la donazione ha con il Regolamento Roma I e con il recente Re-
golamento 650/2012. Infine l’ articolo si sofferma sull’ ordinamento giuridico italiano descrivendo le 
problematiche sottese, cercando di elaborare differenti soluzioni che potrebbero essere adottate.
Parole chiave: Donazione, Conflicts of law, EU Private International Law, Legge applicabile, Re-
golamento Roma I, Regolamento 650/2012.
Summary: I. Introduction; II. Basic remarks on donation in modern law; III. Focus on Italian 
legal system; IV. Tentative conclusions.
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I. Introduction
1. The interpreter’s task gets more difficult when he has to classify legal institution that has 
different points of contact with several countries.1 These difficulties increase when the interpreter, in 
particular the court, has to classify an institution whose legal nature is different in certain EU Member 
States. A typical example is represented by donation that in some countries is qualified as a contractual 
obligation and in others as a unilateral act.2 Consider the case of English common law where the qualifi-
cation of donation as “contractual obligation” is not accepted by the English doctrine.3 In fact it is not is 
recognized as a type of contract, but as a mere gift that is by definition gratuitous and therefore the donee 
has no contractual right to demand anything from the donor. In other EU Member States, such as Italy or 
*   I would like to thank Professor Maria Chiara Vitucci for very helpful suggestions. All errors are of course only mine. 
1 e. Vitta, Diritto internazionale privato, III, Utet, Torino, 1975, p. 203.
2 For more see further § II. 
3 W. Morrison, “Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England”, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001, § 442. 
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Germany, the donation is classified as a contract. In the light of these considerations this particular issue 
has always been of interest to European academics.      
2. As a consequence it is clear that the interpreter, who interfaces with a donation with points of 
contact with different Member States, should proceed to analyse some preliminary issues, such as: the 
nature of the donation for the State of reference, and then decide if it can be defined as a “contractual 
obligation”; finally if that donation also touches on the system of succession and if the object of the 
donation is an immovable property. 
3. These preliminary assessments are indispensable in order to determine which p.i.l. rule to 
apply.4 In fact the EU regulations do not give a specific classification of donation, nor rule a definition 
of “contractual obligations”.5 The last one is a concept that is not present in any p.i.l. instrument and the 
single national definitions have some elements of difference6, with all the consequences that that entails. 
In fact the term “contractual obligations” or “obbligazioni contrattuali” has, respectively in English 
and Italian legal system, a different meaning from the term “vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse” present 
in German version of the Rome I. The English and Italian terms “obligation” or “obbligazione” only 
refer to a contractual duty whereas the German word “Schuldverhältnisse” has a broader meaning and 
describes an entire complex not only of duty but also of rights.7  
4. In light of the issues above, the unique application of a definition of “contractual obligations” 
for each Member States seems not practicable with the result that the only possible procedure is an au-
tonomous qualification8 of a contractual obligation.9 
5. Therefore considering the lack of a uniform definition at European level of “contractual obliga-
tion” as well as “donation”, the interpreter, in order to identify the applicable law, will have to make a care-
ful examination of the all the circumstances and decide whether that donation for the State of reference 
may be classified as a “contractual obligation”. As a consequence only in this last case will the Rome I (or 
Convention)10 apply; otherwise it will be necessary to assess to apply another p.i.l. rule.11 
4 G. raMondelli, “Le donazioni nel diritto internazionale privato”, in P. Rescigno (ed.), “Trattato breve delle successioni 
e donazioni”, Cedam, Padova, 2010, p. 823 and ivi for more references on donation in Italian p.i.l. 
5 l. FuMaGalli, “La Convenzione di Roma e la Legge regolatrice delle donazioni”, in Rivista di Dritto Internazionale 
Privato e Processuale, 1993, p. 593. 
6 M. Weller, “Rome I art. 1”, in G.P. Calliess (ed.), “Rome Regulations commentary on the European Rules of Conflict of 
Laws”, Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011, p. 39. The Author takes in consideration the example of the contract 
“into which one party is forced by law, as it is sometimes the case for suppliers of water or electricity”. 
7 Some author has also approximated a modification of the German version with a more appropriate term such as “vertra-
gliche Pflichten” or “vertragliche Verbindlicheiten”. On this point a. J. BêlohláVek, Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation: 
commentary, new EU conflict-of-laws rules for contractual obligation, Huntington, N.Y., Juris, 2010, II, pp. 103 - 104. 
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 107. In the absence of a general definition understood as an EU concept of contractual obligation, the Author held 
that this could be defined as “a relationship based upon the free expression of will of two or more parties which […] an inter-
section of these expressions is required”. In different way see M. MCParland, The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, O.U.P., Oxford, 2015, p. 183. According to the Author “the interpretation of the concept of ‘contractual 
obligation’ will be shaped by the guidance given by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has yet to come”. 
10 It should be pointed out that the starting point here is not an analysis of the Rome Convention, which still applies today to any 
contracts dated prior to 17 December 2009 as well as contracts entered into with Denmark. In fact Article 1 (4) of Regulation makes a 
clear distinction between “Member States to the Regulation” and “Member States of the European Union”. This clarification is based 
on the circumstance that Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland, by virtue of the opting out and opting in schemes, agreed upon 
in the drafting of the Treaty of Amsterdam, may refrain from the automatic application of Community regulations. To date Ireland 
and the United Kingdom have opted in, therefore, only Denmark remains excluded, and has not yet expressed the intention to join 
the Rome I. It follows that the Danish courts will still continue to apply the criteria dictated by the Convention, at least until Denmark 
formally agrees to adhere to the Rome I. Therefore the territorial aspect, which has always played a very important role in private in-
ternational law and has become a very ambiguous term, to date, with Denmark which has not adhered to the Rome I, could still cause 
several problems in terms of interpretation. In the same way in G. Passarelli, The Protection of the European consumer in Private 
International Law. Some General Remarks, in Contratto e Impresa/Europa, 2014, pp. 204-205.  
11 Contra G. BiaGioni, “L’ ambito di applicazione del regolamento sulle successioni”, in P. Franzina – a. leandro (eds.), Il 
diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni mortis causa, Giuffrè, Milano, 2013, p. 38. According to the Author “le 
donazioni anche quando avvengano per atto unilaterale sarebbero sempre disciplinate dal Regolamento «Bruxelles I» e dal Rego-
lamento «Roma I»”. 
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II. Basic remark on donation in modern law
6. The preliminary draft of the Rome Convention, explicitly excluded the p.i.l. rules from apply-
ing12 “en matière […] de donation”13, but then did not mention the matter in the final text of the Conven-
tion and in the same way neither did Rome I. 
7. As seen, the application of the said p.i.l. rule is subject to the nature of donation as a contrac-
tual obligation for the State of reference and the extraneousness of matrimonial relationship, wills and 
succession.14 In fact the donation is qualified as a contract in some EU national legal system, as Italy 
(artt. 769 - 809 Codice civile), France (art. 894 Code civil) and Germany (§516 – 534 BGB), in others 
as in the case of Scotland has the nature of unilateral act. 
8. The unilateral act15 can be qualified as contract and identifying the characteristic performer in 
this type of contract is certainly a less complex task for the interpreter than doing so in bilateral contracts.16 
Indeed in reference to the Scottish legal system the task of identifying the applicable law is more com-
plex. In fact where the donation is qualified as a unilateral act “in that only one party is actively involved 
in the promissory or donative act”17, it is important to point out that the interpreter in the delicate task of 
identifying the applicable law must considerer that “in Scotland, the idea of unilateral denotes that is the 
number of parties required to constitute an obligation, so a contract can never be unilateral given that all 
contracts require the cooperation of two parties at least in order to be constituted”.18 The consequence is 
that in the case of donation with contact points with Scotland the provisions of the Rome I (Convention) 
could not apply. 
9. Instead in EU Member States like France, Germany or Italy the contractual nature of the 
donation is uncontested, therefore as a general rule it should not cast doubt on the application of the 
rules of p.i.l. to the contractual obligations. Therefore, in absence of parties choice19 governs the party 
12 l. FuMaGalli, “La Convenzione di Roma e la Legge regolatrice delle donazioni”, (5), p. 591. 
13 See Giuliano – Lagarde, ‘Rapport concernant l’ avant-project de convention sur la loi applicable aux obligations contrac-
tuelles et non-contractuelles’, in Rivista di diritto internazionale provato e processuale, 1973, p. 208.
14 In reference to the Rome Convention see l. Gatt, “Art. 1 della Convenzione sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni 
contrattuali del 19 giugno 1980”, in C.M. BianCa – a. Giardina (eds.), Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, 1995, p. 920 and in 
reference to Rome I Regulation see G. BiaGioni, “Art. 1, in Commentario al Regolamento CE n. 593/2008 del Parlamento 
europeo e del Consiglio del 17 giugno 2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (“Roma I”)”, in Nuove leggi 
civili commentate, 2009, p. 567. 
15 F. sBordone, Contratti Internazionali e Lex Mercatoria, E.S.I., Napoli, 2008, p. 78. According to the Author “Sollecita 
maggiori dubbi e riflessioni la prospettata inclusione nella disciplina di conflitto di cui al Regolamento Roma I delle obbliga-
zioni derivanti da negozi unilaterali. In linea di principio, per un negozio unilaterale con elementi di estraneità fonte di obbli-
gazioni non si potrebbe ricorrere alla disciplina di conflitto disposta dal Re.cit., poiché obbligazione di fonte non contrattuale; 
tant’è che la legge italiana di riforma del diritto internazionale privato (l. n. 218/1995) include nel Capo XI, dedicato alle 
obbligazioni non contrattuali, un articolo specifico per la fattispecie della promessa unilaterale (art. 58); per cui la promessa 
unilaterale, quale tipica e più frequente manifestazione di negozio unilaterale, è regolata dalla legge dello Stato in cui viene 
manifestata). Ciò premesso, sembrerebbe confermarsi l’idea per la quale qualsiasi manifestazione unilaterale di volontà ido-
nea a produrre effetti giuridici regolativi degli interessi del dichiarante andrebbe piuttosto ricompresa in quest’ultima specifica 
disciplina di conflitto (art. 58, l. n. 218/1995). Giova, però, osservare che la varietà e la consistenza del fenomeno – tali da 
porre in alcune circostanze il negozio unilaterale addirittura in posizione di fungibilità con il contratto – potrebbero consiglia-
re il ricorso alle norme di conflitto di cui al Regolamento Roma I”. 
16 C. s. a. okoli - G. o. arishe, “The Operation of the escape clauses in the Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation and 
Rome II Regulation”, in Journal of Private International Law, 2012, p. 516. In jurisprudence see Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) 20 July 2005 case Ark Therapeutics plc v. True North Capital Ltd. 
17 h. MaCQueen / M. hoGG, “Donation in Scots Law”, in Juridical Review, 2012, p. 3. 
18 M. a. hoGG, “Promise and Donation in Louisiana and Comparative Law”, in Tulane European & Civil Law Forum, 
2011, p. 176.
19 Party autonomy is one of the most important principles in private international law and, as known, the parties, in a national 
or more frequently in an international contract, are free to choose whichever law they want especially when the contract has 
connections with more countries. About the party autonomy see M.J. Bonell, Le regole oggettive del commercio internazionale. 
Clausole tipiche e condizioni generali Giuffrè, Milano, 1976, pp. 261 ss.; G. de noVa, “Pluralità di fonti e tipi contrattuali nel 
commercio internazionale”, in u. draetta / C. VaCCà (eds.), Fonti e tipi del contratto internazionale, EGEA, Milano, 1991 p. 
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autonomy, the applicable law to the donation will be identified by starting the connecting factors of 
Article 4 (2) or (1 - c)20 in the case of a donation of immovable property.21 
10. However learned editors have suggested22 that the donation has the closest connection23 with 
the country where the donor, that is the party obligated to carry out the characteristic performance,24 has 
its habitual residence25 at time of conclusion of the donation.26 Nevertheless this cannot be considered a 
standard rule. In fact if the donation is made conditionally27, it is necessary for the interpreter to local-
ize carefully what is the characteristic performance of the donee or the donor and then apply the law of 
habitual residence of the characteristic performer. 
11. Such a case could be one in which a wealthy Italian donor makes the donation of a small 
house in a small town in Germany to his young Ukrainian housekeeper (donee) with the obligation to 
assist his three children for a lifetime. In this particular case it appears equitable to consider that the 
“non-monetary performance”28 (Nicht-Geldleistung) is that of the donee and the donor is not the person 
obliged to make the characteristic performance. Therefore in this circumstance the applicable law will 
be that of the habitual residence of the donee. 
12. In the above example, the object of the donation is an immovable property, as a consequence 
in this case the interpreter could also apply the hard-and-fast rule of art. 4.1 (c ) of the Rome I where 
the connection factor is one of the lex rei sitae,29 so that as a consequence a law not close to the contract 
will be applied.  
13. In light of these considerations it is clear that the interpreter in the task of identifying the 
law applicable to the donation must consider carefully all the circumstances at stake in order to apply 
the most equitable law.
2 ss.; H. Hoyer, “Der Anwendungsbereich des Einheitlichen Wiener Kaufrechts”, in H. Hoyer – W. Posch (eds.) Das Einheitli-
che Wiener Kaufrecht. Neues Recht für den Internationalen Warenkauf, Orac, Wien, 1992, p. 41; s. rodotà, “Aspettando un 
codice?”, in Rivista critica del diritto privato, 1998, p. 6; r. Plender / M. WildersPin, The European Contracts Convention. The 
Rome Convention on the Choice of Law for Contracts, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001, pp. 4 ss..
20 F. Ferrari – J. a. BisChoFF, Article 4, in F. Ferrari (ed.) Rome I Regulation. Pocket commentary Sellier, Munich, 2014, 
p. 144. 
21 Instead will be applied Article 4 (1) of the Convention if the donation is prior to December 17, 2009. For more see supra 
(10).
22 diCey & Morris, The conflict of laws, 15th ed. (L. Collins ed.), Sweet&Maxwell, London, 2012, no. 33-008, 1884; a. J. 
BêlohláVek, Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation, ( 7), p. 244; l. FuMaGalli, “La Convenzione di Roma e la legge regolatrice 
delle donazioni”, (5), p. 591.
23 l.F. kuyVen, “Convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles - Article 4 (5) 
sur la loi applicable à défaut de choix - Note sur la décision de la Cour de cassation (France) du 19 décembre 2006”, in Uniform 
Law Review, 2007, p. 382; P. Volken, “How Common are the General Principles of Private International Law? America and 
Europe Compared”, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 1999, pp. 85 ss.
24 About the characteristic performance see h. u. Jessurun d’oliVeira, “Characteristic Obligation in the draft EEC Obliga-
tion Convention”, in American Journal and Comparative Law, 1977, pp. 303 ss.; F. VisCher, “The Principle of the typical per-
formance in International contracts and the draft Convention”, in k.liPstein (ed), Harmonization of Private International Law 
by the E.E.C., (University London, 1978), pp. 25 ss.; M. MaGaGni, La prestazione caratteristica nella Convenzione di Roma 
del 19 maggio 1980, Giuffrè, Milano, 1989, pp. 118 - 428; u. Villani, “Aspetti problematici della prestazione caratteristica”, 
in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 1993, pp. 514 ss.; M. VirGós soriano, “La ley applicable a los con-
tractos internacionales: la regla de los vinculos estrechos y la presuncion basada en la prestaciòn caractieristica del contrato”, 
in Estudios juridicos en homenaje al professor Aurelio Menéndez, Civitas, Madrid, 1996, pp. 5289 ss.
25 On this point with reference to Italian case law see Tribunale Venezia 28 febbraio 2003 in (2004) Rivista di diritto inter-
nazionale privato e processuale, pp. 272 ss.
26 l. FuMaGalli, “La Convenzione di Roma e la Legge regolatrice delle donazioni”, (5), p. 599. 
27 This type of donation is in force in Italian and German legal (525 BGB) systems.
28 J. hill, “Choice of law in contract under the Rome Convention: the approach of the UK Courts”, in International Com-
parative Law Quarterly, 2004, p. 334. The Author mentioned the Scottish case William Grant & Sons International Ltd vs. 
Marie Brizard Espana SA, [1998].
29 G.P. Calliess, Rome Regulations Commentary on the European rules of the conflict of laws, Kluwer Law International, 
Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011, p. 92.
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III. Focus on Italian legal system
14. Given that in some Member States, such as Italy, the donation is a contract30, it should be 
noted that the interpreter may still in some circumstances not apply the rules of p.i.l. on the contractual 
obligations31 to a donation. This can happen for example when the court does not consider the gift as 
a donation because it lacks the subjective requirements (animus donandi) and objective requirements 
(enrichment of a part and impoverishment of another)32, or in other circumstances. This is a case of 
those donations that are not derived from the contract or of those that are included in the field of family 
law and inheritance.33 
15. Certainly the “donazione obnuziale”34 according to some Authors35 are not included within 
the scope of the Rome I (Convention), regulated by art. 785 Codice civile, i.e. the agreement between 
future spouses for purposes of governing the financial positions subsequent to marriage.36 The reasons 
underlying the exclusion of this type of donation are twofold: firstly it can be assessed as a unilateral 
act (art. 1334 Codice civile) with the result that the effects are dependent on the celebration of the mar-
riage37; secondly the close relationship that this donation has with the marriage certificate and as such 
not the target application of the Rome I (Convention). Indeed other authors38, divide the “donazione 
obnuziale” into two subcategories, one framed as an agreement between future spouses and the other 
established by a third party in favor of one or both spouses and as such as a simple donation and subject 
to discipline referred to in Rome I (Convention). 
16. The exclusion operates also with reference to the “donazioni tra coniugi”39 which, following 
the repeal of Article 781 c.c.40, may take the form of “donazioni indirette”.41 This is when acts between 
spouses produce the economic effects of a donation, although they are not donations from a legal point 
of view. 
17. Finally also “mortis causa” donations, permitted by the laws of some Member States but not 
by the Italian law42, stay out of the scope of the Rome I (Convention)43 because they aim to deal with the 
30 According to Art. 769 Codice civile “A gift is a contract by which, in the spirit of liberality, one party enriches the other, 
disposing of one of his rights in the other’s favor or assuming an obligation toward him”. The translation is made by S. Bel-
traMo, The Italian Civil Code, Thomson Reuters, 2012, pp. 169 – 170.
31 G. laurini, “I limiti di applicabilità della Convenzione”, in Rivista del Notariato, 1983, pp. 56 ss.
32 M. Vellano, “La donazione nel diritto internazionale privato”, in G. Bonilini (ed.) Trattato di diritto delle successioni e 
donazioni, Giuffrè, Milano, 2009, pp. 1285 – 1286. 
33 G. raMondelli, Le donazioni nel diritto internazionale privato, (4), p. 831.
34 In English “Gift in contemplation of marriage” according to the translation of s. BeltraMo, (30), p. 173.
35 e. Vitta (1), pp. 203 ss.; G. ziCCardi CaPaldo, “La donazione propter nuntias e la sua disciplina nel diritto internazio-
nale privato italiano”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 1973, p. 601 ss.
36 o. loMBardi, Art. 785, in G. PerlinGieri (ed.) Codice civile annotato con la dottrina e la giurisprudenza, E.S.I., Napoli, 
2010, pp. 815 ss.
37 Ex multis a. torrente, “La donazione”, in u. CarneVali /a. Mora (eds.), Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, Giuf-
frè, Milano, 2006, pp. 197 ss.; l. Gatt, La liberalità, II, Utet, Torino, 2012, p. 43 footnote n. 80.
38 l. Gatt, “Art. 1 della Convenzione sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali del 19 giugno 1980”, (14), p. 922.
39 Unofficial English “donations between spouses”. 
40 Repealed with the Constitutional Court ruling. June 27, 1973 n. 91 because was declared unconstitutional.
41 Governed by art. 809 Codice civile that can be qualified as other acts of liberality.  
42 In reference to circumstance in Italian p.i.l. national regulation see n. BosChiero, “Riforma del sistema italiano del 
sistema di diritto internazionale privato, sub Art. 56 Donazioni”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, 
1995, p. 1171.
43 M. Vellano, “La donazione nel diritto internazionale privato”, in G. Bonilini (ed.) Trattato di diritto delle successioni e 
donazioni, Giuffrè, Milano, 2009, p. 1295. According to the Author the opinion of whole Italian legal doctrine is that this type 
of donation must be excluded by the application of Rome I (Convention). In the same way with several reservations a. BonoMi, 
“Successions internationales: conflits de lois et de jurisdictions”, in Recueil des cours, 2010, pp.284 ss.; J. re, “Sui requisiti di 
forma delle donazioni nel diritto internazionale privato”, in Famiglia e diritto, 2013, p. 469.  
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2015), Vol. 7, Nº 2, pp. 476-482
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
GianluiGi Passarelli Donation: Short notes between Italian Civil Law…
481
allocation of goods in view of death.44 Indeed some Italian doctrine45 raised an objection, pointing out that 
the donations subject to the premature death of the donor have legal nature of atto inter vivos, with the 
result that the Rome I (Convention) will be applied; otherwise the EU Regulation 650/201246 will be ap-
plied. As a consequence the rules on succession and not Rome I (Convention), are applied in those Mem-
ber States where the donation “mortis causa” is described as a juridical act connected to the succession.47
18. Finally, a brief mention deserves to be made to the “patto di famiglia”.48 This not only to the 
various parties involved for various reasons and the strong connection with the “donation”49 but also for 
the implications for the agreements as to succession.50 In fact these issues may give rise to many doubts 
of interpretation in the enforcement of p.i.l. rule. 
19. According to some academics the “patto di famiglia” is “il nuovo contratto tipico a forma 
solenne con il quale un imprenditore trasferisce, con effetto immediato, senza ricevere alcun corris-
pettivo, in tutto o in parte la propria azienda […] ad uno o più discendenti”.51 Although it has strong 
implications and interference with inheritance matters, some academics52 believes that the “patto di 
famiglia” should be included in the application of the Rome I for its contractual nature. This interpreta-
tion is shared not only because the “patto di famiglia” is by definition a contract but also because the EU 
44 a. BonoMi, “Donazione (diritto internazionale privato)”, in Enciclopedia diritto aggiornamento, Giuffrè, Milano, 1998, 
pp. 307 ss.; l. FuMaGalli, “La Convenzione di Roma e la Legge regolatrice delle donazioni”, (5), p. 595.
45 Ex multis G. raMondelli, “Le donazioni nel diritto internazionale privato”, (4), p. 842. 
46 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of suc-
cession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession. This Regulation shall apply to the succession of persons 
who die on or after 17 August 2015. On this EU Regulation see ex multis t. Ballarino, “Il nuovo regolamento europeo sulle 
successioni”, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2013, pp. 116 ss.; a. BonoMi, “Il regolamento europeo sulle successioni”, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2013, pp. 249 ss.; P. Franzina, “Ragioni, valori e collazione sistematica 
della disciplina internazionalprivatistica europea delle successioni mortis causa”, in P. Franzina / a. leandro (eds.), Il diritto 
internazionale privato europeo delle successioni mortis causa, Giuffrè, Milano, 2013, p. 3. P. laGarde, “Les principes de base 
du nouveau règlement européen sur les successiones”, in Reveu critique, 2012, pp. 691 ss.  
47 G. BiaGioni, “L’ Ambito di applicazione del regolamento sulle successioni”, in P. Franzina – a. leandro (eds.), (11), p. 
39; J.G. Miller, International Aspects of Succession, Ashgate/Dartmouth, London, 2000, p. 47, according to which “the mortis 
causa donation should be classified as an inter vivos transfer for the purpose of traditional conflict rules”. 
48 This juridical act was introduced in Italy with the Law n. 55 14.2.2006 and regulated by art- 768-bis ss. According to s. 
BeltraMo, (30), p. 768, this legal institution is translated as “Family Pact”. 
49 s. delle MonaChe, “Spunti ricostruttivi e qualche spigolatura in tema di patti di famiglia”, in Rivista del Notariato, 
2006, pp. 899 ss.; a. Merlo, Il patto di famiglia, in CNN notizie, February 14 2006, p. 4; C. CaCCaVale, “Appunti per uno 
studio sul patto di famiglia: profili strutturali e funzionali della fattispecie”, in Notariato, 2006, p. 304. Contra G. PerlinGieri, 
“Il patto di famiglia tra bilanciamento dei princípi e valutazione comparativa degli interessi”, in Rassegna di Diritto Civile, 
2008, p.152 ss. According to the Author “Il patto di famiglia non può essere considerato come una donazione, sia pure modale, 
perché il profilo di liberalità, pur caratterizzante, non risolve né esaurisce la funzione del negozio”.
50 This is a “atto a titolo gratuito” that can’t be qualified as “patto successorio”. On this topic see ex multis F. PadoVini, 
“Fenomeno successorio e strumenti di programmazione alternativi al testamento”, in Rivista notarile, 2008, pp. 1007 ss.; F. 
GerBo, “Il patto di famiglia: problemi dommatici. Loro riflessi redazionali”, in Rivista notarile, 2007, pp. 1269 ss.; F. Gazzoni, 
“Appunti e spunti in tema di patto di famiglia”, in Giustizia civile, 2006, pp. 217 ss.
51 N. di Mauro/V. VerdiCChio, “Comment to art. 768-bis c.c.”, in e. MinerVini (ed.), Il Patto di famiglia, Commentario 
alla legge 14 febbraio 2006 n. 55, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, p. 23 - 24. On the same point see u. la Porta, “Il patto di famiglia. 
Struttura e profili causali del nuovo istituto tra trasmissione dei beni di impresa e determinazione anticipata della successione”, 
in u. la Porta (ed), Il Patto di famiglia, Giappichelli, Torino, 2007, p. 4. According to the Author “è un contratto mediante il 
quale l’ imprenditore individuale ovvero titolare di partecipazioni sociali, eletto il discendente ritenuto maggiormente idoneo 
alla prosecuzione della gestione del patrimonio familiare, assegna a costui i beni anzidetti”. 
52 M. Vellano, “La donazione nel diritto internazionale privato”, in G. Bonilini (ed.) Trattato di diritto delle successioni 
e donazioni, Giuffrè, Milano, 2009, p. 1309; d. daMasCelli, Il “patto di famiglia” nel diritto internazionale privato, in Rivista 
di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2007, p. 619 ss. According to the Author this juridical act is a contract that is 
not inserted in the legal aspects of successions. Contra G. BiaGioni, “Art. 1, in Commentario al Regolamento CE n. 593/2008 
del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 17 giugno 2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (“Roma I”)”, 
(14), p. 568; F. VisMara, “Patti successori nel Regolamento (UE) n. 650/2012 e patti di famiglia: un’ interferenza possibile?”, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2014, p. 811. According to the Author: “il patto di famiglia può rilevare 
ai fini del regolamento n. 650/2012 o nell’ ipotesi in cui venga qualificato come accordo con finalità di divisione”. 
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lawmakers within the next EU Regulation 650/2012 governing succession, not encompassing53 it which 
cannot be qualified as an agreement as to succession54 in its scope.
IV. Tentative conclusions
20. On the basis of the above considerations, it is clear that the court could have difficulty in to 
identify the applicable law when it is faced with a donation that has points of contact with various coun-
tries. This is not only because this juridical act, as seen, has a different characterization in the Member 
States but also because the rules of EU p.i.l. do not allow a clear and simple identification of the appli-
cable law as well as of the term “contractual obligations”. However it requires some more attention, and 
in particular whether that donation can also fall under Rome I or should apply other p.i.l. rules. 
21. These problems are magnified by the fact that the “escape clause” of Article 4 (3) of the 
Rome I can be applied only in particular circumstances. Therefore the interpreter discretionary power 
is limited in the task to identify the most equitable law. Hence the critical analysis of the strict criteria 
adopted by the framers of EU lawmakers on rules of p.i.l. subject to contractual obligations. 
In fact the rigid and inflexible escape clause characterized by a “manifestly”55 closest connection 
with another country, limits the discretionary power of the interpreter. The word “manifestly”, in the 
opinion of BeauMont / MCeleaVy, means “obvious”56 or in the opinion of CalVo CaraVaCa / CarrasCo-
sa Gonzàlez, when there is “a vinculaciòn purament formal, nominal, fugaz, anecdòtica y aparente”.57 
In a few words the “escape clause” can be applied when the circumstances are clear or evident to the 
eyes of the interpreter. Therefore in a case such as the example above58 where there is a donation and 
the connection is not obvious and the circumstances are unclear then, in absence of parties choice, the 
interpreter’s task is obstructed by rigid rules. 
22. In conclusion a flexible “escape clause” could guarantee more discretionary power to the 
court and at the same time to the application of the most equitable law that is closely connected to the 
contract. Therefore the need for flexible p.i.l. rules59 and the importance of the rule of the interpreter in 
the task of identifying the applicable law, emerge particularly when the court is faced with a legal insti-
tution as donation that has a different legal nature in the Member States and where is important also to 
identify the more appropriate p.i.l. instrument in order to apply the most equitable law. 
53 EU Regulation 650/2012 art. 1. 2 (g) “The following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation: property 
rights, interests and assets created or transferred otherwise than by succession”. Art. 1.2.(h) “questions governed by the law 
of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, such as clauses in the memoranda of association and articles of 
association of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, which determine what will happen to the shares upon 
the death of the members”. 
54 According to e. MinerVini, “Comment to art. 458 c.c.”, (51), pp. 16 and 19 the “patto di famiglia” is neither a “patto 
successorio istitutivo” nor “un patto successorio dispositivo o rinunziativo”. On the same way see also F. Gazzoni, (50), p. 217. 
55 By some Authors defined as “key change” see P. r. BeauMont - P.e. MCeleaVy, Private International Law, Thomson 
Reuters, Edinburg, 2011, p. 480. 
56 Ibid.
57 A. l. CalVo CaraVaCa – J. CarrasCosa Gonzàlez, Derecho Internacional privado, Comares, Granada, 2014, p. 863. 
58 See the above mentioned example in § II. 
59 “F. sChWind, Problems of codification of Private International Law, in  International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1968, p. 434. According to the Author: “In p.i.l. flexibility seems to be of preponderant importance. In fact is important that 
provisions are kept sufficiently flexible”; G. Passarelli, The Voluntary assignment of receivables in private international law, 
in Studi sull’ integrazione europea, 2014, p. 336.
